Pick length over cleverness. A password of 16 or more random characters, or a passphrase of eight or more random words, is beyond reach of an offline attack for the foreseeable future. Everything else people fuss over, swapping a for 4 or adding an exclamation mark on the end, adds almost nothing, because attackers run those substitutions as rules on top of a dictionary.
The number that actually matters is entropy, measured in bits. Each bit doubles the work. A password drawn uniformly from a pool of 88 characters carries log2(88), about 6.46 bits per character, so 20 characters is about 129 bits. A passphrase from a 1,024 word list carries exactly 10 bits per word, so five words is 50 bits and eight words is 80. That is why the generator above prints the formula next to the result instead of a vague colour.
How many bits is enough
| What you made | Entropy | Average crack time |
|---|---|---|
| 8 lowercase letters | 37.6 bits | about 1 second |
| 12 characters, all four types | 77.5 bits | about 34 thousand years |
| 5 words from a 1,024 word list | 50 bits | about 1.5 hours |
| 6 words from a 1,024 word list | 60 bits | about 67 days |
| 8 words from a 1,024 word list | 80 bits | about 192 thousand years |
| 20 characters, all four types | 129.2 bits | about 123 quintillion years |
Anything from roughly 75 bits up is fine for a normal account behind a site that hashes properly. Above 100 bits the password stops being the weak link, and the real risk moves to phishing, reused passwords and malware on your own machine. Going from 128 to 256 bits buys you nothing you can use.
Is a browser password generator safe
It is safe when two things are true: the random numbers come from the operating system, and the page does not send anything anywhere. This one calls crypto.getRandomValues, the browser interface to the same system entropy that TLS uses, and it contains no network code at all. You can check that yourself. Open the network panel in your browser tools and press the button; nothing is requested. View the source and search for the word fetch; it is not there.
What a page like this cannot promise is the rest of your device. A malicious browser extension can read anything on screen, and so can a keylogger. If you suspect either, generate the password inside your password manager instead.
Why rejection sampling instead of a remainder
Because the obvious shortcut is biased. Take a random byte, 0 to 255, and do a remainder by 10 to pick a digit: the values 0 to 5 can come from 26 different bytes each, while 6 to 9 come from only 25. The low digits are about 4 percent more likely. Repeat that for every character and the password is measurably weaker than its bit count claims. This generator instead throws away any draw that lands in the uneven tail of the range and draws again, which leaves every character exactly equally likely. The cost is a rare extra draw and the benefit is that the entropy figure is true.
Random characters or a passphrase
Use random characters wherever a machine does the typing, which means anything your password manager fills in. Use a passphrase for the handful you have to type from memory: the master password on your manager, your device login, your email. Five words from a 1,024 word list is 50 bits, which is weak for an offline attack but fine for a login that rate limits, and six or seven words gets you to properly strong while still being something you can say out loud.
Spaces are allowed in passwords on any site that does its job. Where a site rejects them, switch the separator above to a period or an underscore rather than shortening the phrase.
What about the lookalike switch
It drops 0, capital O, lowercase o, 1, lowercase l, capital I and the pipe. Turn it on when a human will read the password off a screen and type it somewhere else, like a wifi key you are reading out or a temporary login you are handing over. It shrinks the pool, so the bit count above drops with it, and the generator shows you the smaller number rather than hiding the trade.
Should a password ever be changed on a schedule
No. Forced rotation every 90 days makes people pick weaker passwords with a counter on the end, and both NIST and the UK NCSC now advise against it. Change a password when you have a reason: a breach notice, a shared login, a device you lost. Otherwise make it long once, store it in a manager and turn on a second factor, which stops the attacks that actually happen to normal people far more often than guessing does.
Can the same password come out twice
In theory yes, in practice no. At 20 characters from an 88 character pool there are about 10 to the power of 38 possibilities, so a repeat would be a stranger coincidence than any collision you have ever seen. Nothing is stored between presses, so the page itself has no memory of what it made.